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Preface 
 
 
 
During the past semester this thesis has become increasingly personal to me. At times it 
has been my best friend, but also my greatest source of anger and frustration. For me the 
most important aspect of studying law is that, by knowing it well, I can use it in a good 
way. Strangely enough, my law studies began as nothing more than a coincidence. 
 
By writing this thesis I have been able to present my views on a worldwide issue and my 
suggestions for progress in this respect. It begins here. We will see what comes of it. I 
sincerely hope I manage to stay true to my ideology. 
 
Although grateful for the technological advantages in my time, I have experienced certain 
mistakes occurring when delivering my thesis electronically. I hope this does not lead to 
misunderstandings. 
 
“All animals are equal-but some animals are more equal than others”. (George Orwell) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        In memory of my father 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 The subject of the thesis 
 
 
Terror is a public enemy that possibly can be characterized as greater than the phenomenon 
of war itself as it targets innocent victims indiscriminately, with lethal force more often 
than not and thereby shockingly destabilizes the very foundation of human life.1 
 
Terrorism flourishes in poverty, suppression, despair, extremism and human rights abuse. 
The goal of a terrorist will often be to create chaos in order to achieve a certain vision.2 
When innocent civilians live in constant fear, under the harassment and uncertainty of 
where and when the next attack will turn into tragic reality, they find themselves in the 
pocket of a person without limitations as to methods and costs in a pursuit of his or her 
objective. 
 
One may ask what sort of response can defeat such a threat to democracy. In an 
introduction it seems reasonable to divide between violent and non-violent responses. For 
the matter of this thesis I will focus on the non-violent approach. If the one can exist 
completely without the other is a question that certainly deserves attention, but will not be 
thoroughly commented on in this thesis. 
                                                
1 War is meant in the traditional sense of the word, namely combat between the armed forces of two or more 
States, that is governed by international humanitarian law setting certain standards for warfare and 
absolutely prohibits attack on civilian population. See for instance the statutes of the ICC (International 
Criminal Court), which to a certain extent codify international customary law in this respect. For a complete 
overview one may in addition look to The Hague and Geneva conventions regulating war crimes, genocide, 
crimes against humanity, treatment of enemy combatants etc. 
2 Formulated carefully as there currently, despite international dispute on this subject, seems to be no general 
consensus on a conclusive written definition of terrorism. However, this particular aspect seems mostly to be 
agreed upon and certain judicial authors argue that the general notion of terrorism is not in question. The 
dispute concerns the exceptions, for instance groups referred to as “freedom fighters.” See Antonio Cassese, 
International Criminal Law pages 120-125. 
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However, the violent reaction is clearly exemplified by the American “war on terror” after 
the infamous 9/11 incident, which by no means, contrary to what one might believe by 
reading the tabloids, is the first terror attack our modern world has witnessed. 
 
Within the UN concerns have been expressed in relation to violent approaches. Such 
responses can convincingly be argued as incompatible with the general paradox that arises 
when a democratic state is fighting terrorism; the measures taken to defeat terrorism may 
not undermine the human rights they seek to protect. 
 
The possibilities of combating terrorism, while duly respecting human rights, open to 
democratic legal systems will, therefore, be the subject matter of this thesis. 
 
 
 
1.2 The content of the thesis 
 
 
In discussing the above-mentioned subject I will focus on international human rights law 
as its objective is to regulate what a state can do to its citizens. 
 
This will be elaborated on through certain provisions of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and by bringing in relevant judgements from the European Court of Human 
Rights.3 To gain a wider perspective international statements and guidelines, the UN being 
a key role-player, will be taken into consideration. 
 
 
By presenting a look-back in section 2 on how some terror incidents have been dealt with 
in the past, I will point out the relevant facts of a number of cases and compare these to the 
living instrument of international human rights law. 
 
                                                
3 Hereafter referred to respectively as the Convention and the Court. 
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In this Past Perspective, by analyzing the groundbreaking case of McCann and others vs. 
UK,4 most questions will arise with regards to Article 2 of the Convention and the 
absolutely necessary use of force. In my opinion the case of McCann and others vs. UK is 
important because it sets a standard as to how Article 2 should be understood. Its 
importance is underlined by the fact that the Court was sitting as a Grand Chamber when 
giving this judgement. Supplementing this part of the thesis will be other early judgements 
regarding terrorism that cast light over different Articles of the Convention. 
 
The goal in this perspective is to assess how States were capable of dealing with the threat 
posed by terrorism pre 9/11. 
 
 
In section 3, the Present Perspective, I find it imperative to consider how the international 
community is handling terrorism today. This includes a discussion on which measures 
have been taken in order to defeat terrorism in present time and how questions evolve in 
relation to several Articles of the Convention, namely Articles 2, 3, 5, 8, and to a certain 
degree Articles 6, 9 and 10. 
 
I will try to shed light on different approaches taken, both the violent and non-violent. 
Although the former will not be a comprehensive part of this thesis it must be mentioned in 
order to provide a sufficient overview of the current situation. Such an overview demands 
that the recent international developments are considered. To achieve this I will rely on 
international guidelines and statements. 
 
The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy will also be commented on, even if this 
crosses a blurry line into the future perspective of my thesis. If it is possible with regards to 
where the world stands today on this problem, some conclusions will be drawn. 
 
 
Section 4 of my thesis, the Future Perspective, will concentrate on prospects for the time to 
come. I will attempt to sufficiently define terrorism to what may be accepted at an 
international level. 
                                                
4 McCann and others vs. UK, Series A324-1898/91, judgement of 27 September 1995. 
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Since my aim is to partly focus on the reactive nature of law, the law by its nature responds 
to an act that has already taken place, the legal possibilities to prevent terrorist attacks will 
be focused on and held up against the Articles mentioned above. However, the mission of 
drawing a concrete line in this respect belongs to the Court. Giving a presentation of 
forward-looking strategies is rather difficult compared to assessing the developments until 
now. This brings up the point that terrorism does not confine itself to be only a legal 
question, but also one of respect and tolerance between cultures. 
 
One must in addition consider how terrorism may develop, if it will stay in its current form 
and shape, or mutate both in respect of building networks and methods used. 
 
This raises important questions as to how a democratic State can prevent and defeat 
terrorism in the future, without violating the established human rights law that is laid down 
by the international community. 
 
 
Finally, in section 5, I will present the conclusions I have drawn during the writing of this 
thesis. 
 
The above-mentioned entails firstly, although expressions such as “war on terror” may 
cause confusion, that international humanitarian law is not the main focus in this paper. It 
will be briefly commented on in relation to certain aspects of the recent developments. 
Secondly, the problem I have chosen to discuss does not leave room for issues that surface 
after a terror attack has happened. Therefore, aspects related to this issue will not be 
discussed in this thesis. 
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2 Past Perspective 
 
 
 
2.1. The case of McCann and others vs. UK 
 
 
2.1.1 Introduction 
 
The objective of the Court, seated as a Grand Chamber, in the case of McCann vs. UK was 
to decide whether the United Kingdom breached their obligations under Article 2 of the 
Convention, regarding the right to life and use of force, in dealing with an alleged terror 
attack supposed to take place on Gibraltar.5 Article 2 of the Convention reads as follows: 
 
"1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived 
of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 
 
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this 
Article (art. 2) when it results from the use of force which is no more than 
absolutely necessary: 
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person 
lawfully detained; 
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection." 
 
 
2.1.2 The facts of the case 
 
In order to provide a correct impression of the events in McCann and others vs. UK the 
following is based on the Court’s assessment of the facts.6 
 
                                                
5 McCann and others vs. UK, Series A324-1898/91, judgement of 27 September 1995. 
6 See para 12 and following of the judgement, “As to the facts/Particular circumstances of the case”. 
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English, Spanish and Gibraltar authorities had for a certain period of time been aware of a 
terror attack being planned by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) against Gibraltar. It was 
considered highly probable that the intentions were to strike during a ceremonial changing 
of guard at the First Battalion of the Royal Anglian Regiment. There were also clear 
suspicions as to which day and by which means the attack would be carried out. The option 
considered most likely was use of explosives, probably in the form of a car bomb. 
 
Soldiers from the SAS were briefed on the situation and sent to Gibraltar to “assist the 
Gibraltar police to arrest the IRA active service unit ("ASU") should the police”; led by the 
Commissioner, “request such military intervention”.7 Information obtained through 
surveillance concluded that the “ASU” would consist of Daniel McCann, Sean Savage and 
a woman as a third member, later identified as Mairead Farrell. This group was presumed 
to be armed, dangerous and highly educated in the use of explosives. The original intention 
of the counter-operation was therefore,8 
 
(a) to protect life; 
(b) to foil the attempt; 
(c) to arrest the offenders; 
(d) the securing and safe custody of the prisoners. 
 
 
Soldier F (senior military advisor and officer of the SAS) was provided with “Rules of 
engagement for the Military Commander in Operation Flavius”, stating as follows 
regarding use of force in pursuit of the suspected terrorists:9 
 
"Use of force 
4. You and your men will not use force unless requested to do so by the senior 
police officer(s) designated by the Gibraltar Police Commissioner; or unless it is 
necessary to do so in order to protect life. You and your men are not then to use 
more force than is necessary in order to protect life. 
 
Opening fire 
5. You and your men may only open fire against a person if you or they have 
reasonable grounds for believing that he/she is currently committing, or is about to 
commit, an action which is likely to endanger your or their lives, or the life of any 
other person, and if there is no other way to prevent this. 
                                                
7 SAS is short for Special Air Service, which is a specially trained unit of the British armed forces. See para 
15 of the judgement. 
8 See para 17. 
9 See para 16. 
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Firing without warning 
6. You and your men may fire without warning if the giving of a warning or 
any delay in firing could lead to death or injury to you or them or any other person, 
or if the giving of a warning is clearly impracticable. 
 
Warning before firing 
7. If the circumstances in paragraph 6 do not apply, a warning is necessary 
before firing. The warning is to be as clear as possible and is to include a direction 
to surrender and a clear warning that fire will be opened if the direction is not 
obeyed." 
 
The three suspects were sighted in Malaga in Spain on the 4th of March 1988. Due to 
uncertainty of when they would approach Gibraltar the group was put under surveillance 
on the Commissioner’s order. 
 
At this point the participants in the anti-terror operation were divided in three distinct 
groups, namely the military group, the police group and the surveillance/security group. 
Each group had their own specific routines for and means of communication. The 
Commissioner conducted a briefing attended by representatives from each group during 
the night between March 5th and 6th 1988 and stressed the importance of gathering 
evidence for subsequent trial of the suspects. In addition, views on different methods of 
detonation were discussed. A remote-control device was under the circumstances found to 
be most likely. The military branch of the operation, consisting of the SAS soldiers, was 
given the impression by their SAS attack commander (soldier E) that this attack would be a 
“button job”.10 This assessment entailed, as was discussed in light of the very short time 
factor a “button job” involves, a likelier chance of shooting to kill. 
 
Soldier E confirmed the ruthlessness of these terrorists and explicitly told his men that they 
would resort to whatever weapons or “button jobs” they carried in the case of a 
confrontation. Finally, he emphasized to his group the strong likelihood of at least one of 
the suspected terrorists carrying such a “button job”. 
 
On the 6th of March 1988 members of the surveillance team and the police group were 
patrolling the streets of Gibraltar. Soldiers A, B, C and D from the military branch, were 
dressed in civilian clothing and armed. They were working in pairs and connected both to 
                                                
10 See para 26 of the judgement. 
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the tactical net and the surveillance net respectively through radio communication. 
 
A separate surveillance team was placed at the border, in addition to an arrest group 
nearby. Soldier E (attack commander) and F (senior military advisor) expressed that the 
preferred military option would be to intercept and apprehend the suspects in the border 
area, but this was not pursued since positive identification at that time seemed too difficult. 
The preferred approach was therefore to arrest and disarm the suspects on foot in the 
assembly area close to their target, and to defuse the bomb. 
 
An arrest policy of four key indicators was formulated:11 
 
1. if a car was driven into Gibraltar and parked in the assembly area by an 
identified member of the active service unit; 
2. if a car was driven into the assembly area by an ASU member without prior 
warning; 
3. the presence in Gibraltar of the other members of the ASU; 
4. if there was clear indication that terrorists having parked their car bomb 
intended to leave Gibraltar, that is to say, they were heading for the border. 
 
Not to raise suspicion and loosing useful evidence in court, the plan was to make an arrest 
once all three suspects were present and identified. 
 
Sean Savage was spotted at about 14.00 hours and quickly positively identified as the man 
who two hours earlier parked a car in the assembly area taking “the time to get out and 
fiddled with something between the seats”.12 
 
At 14.50 hours Savage was spotted meeting up with the two other suspects. They spent 
considerable time staring at a specific car parked in the assembly area “as if, …., they were 
studying it to make sure it was absolutely right for the effect of the bomb”.13 
 
Soldier G (bomb-disposal advisor) conducted an exterior examination of the car in 
question after the suspects had left the assembly area. Being in the area for less than two 
minutes he detected nothing awkward inside the car, neither anything visibly out of place 
nor was there something that seemed to be concealed. Even so, when reporting to the 
                                                
11 See para 37 of the judgement. 
12 See para 38. 
13 See para 45. 
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Commissioner he regarded the car as a so-called suspect car bomb. 14 
 
Soldier G, later claiming neither to be a radio- nor an explosives expert, based this on his 
discovery of “an old aerial situated centrally on a relatively new car”. This information was 
passed on to all operatives on the ground. Soldier A later stated that he was convinced of 
the existence of a bomb in the area. Soldier C recalled this confirmation of a bomb in the 
area given by Soldier E and also that it was likely to be detonated by Savage as he had 
been seen “fiddling” with something earlier. Soldier D stated that Soldier E had also 
confirmed to him that there was a bomb there. 
 
Later Soldier D said that the possibility that none of the suspects were carrying a remote-
control device, or even the possibility that there was no bomb at all, had never been 
mentioned. At 15.40 hours the Commissioner, deciding to arrest the three suspects on 
suspicion of conspiracy to murder since they were leaving the area, requested the military 
to intercept and apprehend the three suspected terrorists. Soldier F instructed to intervene 
and the soldiers on the ground were informed about the passing of control to arrest by 
soldier E.15 
 
The soldiers had received training in making appropriate apprehensions.16 
 
In the following turn of events ending with the shooting of all three suspects, soldiers A 
and B resumed pursuing and closed up on McCann and Farrell. Ms. Farrell was in 
possession of a large handbag. McCann spotted soldier A when the latter was about ten 
metres behind and appeared to recognize that he was a threat. At this moment soldier A 
drew his gun with the intention of shouting out the rehearsed warning, but stated later that 
he was not sure if the words actually came out. 
 
According to the facts established before the Court, McCann made a sudden and 
aggressive move across the front of his body. In the belief that he was reaching for the 
button that would detonate the bomb soldier A opened fire, shooting McCann in his back 
from a distance of three metres. In the same instance he spotted a movement from Farrell 
                                                
14 See para 48 of the judgement. 
15 See para 54. 
16 See para 55. 
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going for her handbag. Soldier A being under the impression that she was reaching for the 
button as well, shot Farrell in the back too. 
 
Furthermore, all in all firing five shots, soldier A turned back to McCann discharging once 
at his body and twice at his head. 
 
During these events soldier A did not realize that soldier B opened fire as well. 
 
Since soldier B could not see Farrell’s hands while she was making a sharp movement he 
feared Farrell was reaching for the button and opened fire at her, while recognizing a shout 
and shots fired from soldier A. McCann’s hands were also out of sight for soldier B, who 
judged McCann to be in a threatening position and therefore switched fire to his direction. 
Discharging a total of seven shots, soldier B switched yet again towards Farrell and did not 
cease-fire until he was certain that she no longer posed any threat.17 
 
Soldiers A and B denied that the suspects made any attempt to surrender or that they 
continued firing when the suspects already were down.18 Although there were witnesses 
who confirmed the soldiers’ version, this story is contrary to evidence given by three other 
witnesses. A member of the surveillance team stated that McCann and Farrell were still 
fired at “when they were almost on the ground, but not on the ground”.19 
 
Soldiers C and D were in pursuit of the last suspect, Sean Savage. At the time of the 
shootings by soldier A and B, soldier D was three metres away from Savage. He wanted to 
get even closer in order to commence the arrest procedure, when the shots were fired at 
McCann and Farrell. Savage turned around with his arm moving down to the right hip 
area. 
 
A lady standing in the line of fire was pushed away by soldier D who believed that Savage 
was reaching for the detonator, and therefore rapidly discharged nine rounds at the suspect. 
The last two were aimed at his head.20 
 
                                                
17 See para 61, 62 of the judgement. 
18 See para 63. 
19 See para 74. 
20 See para 78. 
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Soldier C recalled in his statement that he shouted “stop” and then drawing his gun. He 
spotted Savage’s movement to his right hip area along with something bulky in Savage’s 
right hand pocket, which he feared would be the detonator. At a distance of about five or 
six feet away from Savage soldier C fired six rounds at the suspect’s body, two bullets 
hitting the neck and head as a result of Savage falling down. The two soldiers C and D 
later stated that “once it became necessary to open fire they would continue shooting until 
the person was no longer a threat”.21 However, also these two soldiers denied shooting 
Savage while he was on the ground. 
 
Soldier E (attack commander) stated that the intention in such a situation was to kill, as this 
was “the only way to remove the threat”, adding that this was the standard to follow by any 
soldier in the army opening fire.22 
 
At approximately 16.00 hours soldier F returned control to the Commissioner. Soldier G 
commenced clearance of the “suspect car-bomb”. Searching the bodies of McCann, 
Savage, and Farrell along with her handbag resulted in discovering that the suspects had 
been unarmed and were not carrying any detonating devices.23 
 
Only at the scene where the Savage shootings had taken place some cartridge positions 
were marked. Except for an outline made of Savage’s position indicating the position of 
five bullets, there were made no markings or police photographs of the bodies.24 The 
assembly area was declared safe between 19.00 and 20.00 hours, no bombs or explosive 
devices were found in the car.25 
 
After several indications leading to a car parked in a car-park in Marbella, the Malaga 
bomb-disposal team found altogether 64 kg semtex explosives. This car was found rented 
in the name of one of the suspect’s aliases.26 
 
To comment shortly on the forensic and pathological evidence of the shootings it was 
found that the distance of firing could not have been more than six feet. In Ms. Farrell’s 
                                                
21 See para 80 of the judgement. 
22 See para 80. 
23 See para 93. 
24 See para 94, 95. 
25 See para 96. 
26 See para 99. 
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case it was considered reasonable that she received her shots to the face while facing the 
shooter, causing her to fall away and receive the shots to the back. Altogether shot eight 
times, it was agreed that she was going or was already down at some point receiving 
them.27 
 
Concerning McCann, evidence suggested that the chest wounds came before the head 
wound and that “he was down or very far down when it was inflicted”.28 
 
In the case of Savage, who was hit by sixteen bullets, it was uttered from professor Watson 
that he was “riddled with bullets” and that it looked like “a frenzied attack”. Professor 
Watson and Pounder agreed that the wounds inflicted on Savage indicated that he was shot 
in the head while lying down.29 
 
 
2.1.3 Proceedings before the Court 
 
The Applicants, Ms Margaret McCann, Mr Daniel Farrell and Mr John Savage alleged that 
the killings committed by the SAS soldiers breached Article 2 of the Convention.30 In 
addressing this issue, the Court underlined the importance of the Convention being an 
instrument of protection for individual human rights, stating that Article 2 ranks as one of 
the most fundamental provisions that are not to be derogated from in peacetime. The Court 
pointed out that the term “absolutely necessary” in Article 2 indicates a stricter test of 
necessity compared to the phrase “necessary in a democratic society” found in Articles 8 – 
11 of the Convention.31 
 
The Court acknowledged that the training, instruction and operational control of State 
agents, in this context, rose issues under Article 2.2. It decided not to assess the criminal 
responsibility of those directly or indirectly involved.32 
 
                                                
27 See para 108 judgement. 
28 See para 109. 
29 See para 110. 
30 See para 1. 
31 See para 149. 
32 See para 173. 
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The Court rejected the Applicants’ claim that the alleged shortcomings in the inquest 
proceedings not mentioned above constituted a violation of Article 2.1 alone. The 
difference between the standards of the Convention and the relevant domestic law was not 
sufficiently great in this regard. The Commission and the Court agreed that the 
requirements were “satisfied if the substance of the Convention right was protected”.33 
 
Evidence produced in this case did not convince the Court to believe that the killing of the 
three suspects was premeditated or tacitly encouraged, rejecting the Applicants’ claim of a 
violation of Article 2 on this ground.34 
 
The Court, after scrutinizing the circumstances surrounding the action of the soldiers, came 
to the conclusion that the soldiers honestly believed it was necessary to open fire in order 
to protect lives. It stated that when based on an honest belief perceived for good reasons 
and in pursuit of the aims listed in Article 2.2 of the Convention, use of force might be 
justified even if the honest belief subsequently turns out to be mistaken. Not to admit a 
State such a margin would be an unrealistic burden on law-enforcement personnel in 
executing their duty. The actions of the SAS soldiers did therefore not by themselves 
constitute a breach of Article 2.2.35 
 
However, the Court rather seriously questioned the control and organization of the 
operation with regards to, amongst other incidents, why the suspects were not arrested at 
an earlier stage and ruling out the possibility of this being a reconnaissance mission. The 
Court also said that the true nature of these “button-jobs” had been over-simplified. It was 
found to be “disquieting” that the “suspect car-bomb” assessment made by soldier G was 
communicated as a “definite identification” to the other soldiers, let alone that several 
other “working hypotheses” were passed on as certainties “making use of lethal force 
almost unavoidable”.36 
 
Bearing in mind the discussion of an increased chance that it would be necessary to shoot 
to kill, the Court found that “…the authorities were bound by their obligation to respect the 
right to life of the suspects to exercise the greatest of care in evaluating the information at 
                                                
33 See para 152-155, 162-164 of the judgement. 
34 See para 179-184. 
35 See para 200. 
36 See para 210. 
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their disposal before transmitting the it to soldiers whose use of firearms automatically 
involved shooting to kill”.37 
 
Furthermore, the Court stated that the soldiers’ “reflex action….lacks the degree of caution 
in the use of firearms to be expected from law-enforcement personnel in a democratic 
society, even when dealing with dangerous terrorist suspects…” It stood in “marked 
contrast to the standard of care reflected in the instructions in the use of firearms by the 
police which had been drawn to their attention and which emphasized the legal 
responsibilities of the individual officer….”38 
 
In the Court’s opinion this suggested “a lack of appropriate care in the control and 
organization of the arrest operation”. When taking these factors, and more, into 
consideration the Court was “not persuaded that the killing of the three terrorists 
constituted the use of force which was no more than absolutely necessary….within the 
meaning of Article 2.2(a)….”.39 
 
For that reason the Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 2 of the 
Convention. 
 
2.1.4 Analysis 
 
When viewing the judgement of McCann and others vs. UK in its context it is worthy of 
note that the British authorities did not appreciate it at this time. The decision was 
characterized as a victory for the IRA and it was put forward that Europe was playing 
havoc with the struggle against terrorism, hereby leaving it less efficient. In a heated public 
discussion Prime Minister John Major stated that the finding was “irresponsible and 
defying common sense”. Adding to this vice-premier Michael Hesseltine announced, “not 
to take the slightest notion of this ludicrous decision”.40 
 
In my view the verdict of the Court in this case must be considered as brave, forward-
                                                
37 See para 211 of the judgement. 
38 See para 212. 
39 See para 212-213. 
40 See “Van Lawless naar een Rechtmatige bestrijding van terrorisme”, by Prof. Dr. Martin Kuijer. 
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looking, therefore highly important and setting the standards for the lawful combating of 
terrorism. The decision was brave because the Court probably was well aware of the 
subsequent criticism, forward-looking because it foresaw the need for protecting human 
rights and highly important because it took firm action in this regard. Protecting human 
rights while defeating terrorism is a view that gains acceptance internationally. 
 
The actions of British authorities in the aftermath of the McCann and others vs. UK verdict 
leave a savage impression of their mentality regarding the struggle against terrorism. When 
considering the facts established before the Court, strikingly the “fire vs. fire” attitude 
becomes apparent through the rather inconsiderate decision-making by commanding 
officers at crucial stages of the operation. 
 
Evidently, the three suspects’ right to life was not of great significance to neither the 
British SAS soldiers nor to those criticizing the Court’s verdict. 
 
This case shows that authorities were in need of developing a more sophisticated and 
forward-looking policy in combating terrorism 
 
Without prejudice to the individual soldier for his actions, the manner of bringing the 
suspects down is open, as is shown by the Court, to severe criticism. 
 
Looking at this case with eyes coloured by the reactive nature of law, irreversible damage 
was done. The rule of law was not given a chance to interfere with the events, resulting in 
no possibility to ensure an objectively fair outcome securing the values of all parties 
involved. Instead, it became necessary to afterwards establish this outcome that per se 
never could achieve the same value. Since three of those involved were dead, the damage 
was already done. 
 
Against those who favour a less intelligent and forward-looking approach to the delicate 
issue of protecting human rights while combating terrorism, or have less faith in the rule of 
law when dealing with it, the legal system has little opportunity to defend its rationality. 
 
In conclusion I suggest that the events in particular, but also the later political atmosphere, 
of the McCann and others vs. UK case put the democratic world’s endeavours against 
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terrorism back in a severe manner. In my opinion it was a chance for democracy, 
represented by the British authorities, to embrace the problem of human rights and 
terrorism at an early stage. Consequently I hold the view that, if so had been the case, 
democracy at present would have been better positioned in preventing and combating 
terrorism. 
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2.2 Some other Cases 
 
 
2.2.1 Article 3 
 
The case of Ireland vs. UK concerns Article 3 of the Convention and the prohibition of 
torture.41 Article 3 is formulated as follows: 
 
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.” 
 
The background for this case was the long-term crisis in Northern Ireland and the 
authorities’ response to the “longest and most violent terrorist campaign witnessed in … 
Ireland”.42 Numerous people were arrested and taken into custody by security forces that 
acted in pursuance of emergency powers. Allegations of ill-treatment were made by 
Ireland that presented written evidence concerning 228 cases.43 The arrested persons were 
detained at five different detention centres. At one centre the detainees were subjected to 
an “interrogation in depth” which involved wall-standing, hooding, subjection to noise, 
deprivation of sleep and deprivation of food and drink.44  
 
Four judges voted that such treatment amounted to torture. Detainees made allegations of 
severe beatings and otherwise physical ill-treatment from another detention centre, also 
claiming the treatment to be “applied in a sort of scheme to make them talk”.45 The Court 
established these two practices as inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3. It 
could not be ascertained whether the practices at the three remaining detention centres 
amounted to violation of this Article. 
 
An interesting decision was made by the European Commission of Human Rights in the 
Application of Ensslin, Baader and Raspe vs. Germany with regards to in particular 
                                                
41 Case of Ireland vs. UK, Application 5310/71, judgement 18 January 1978. 
42 See para 11 of the judgement. 
43 See para 92-93. 
44 See para 96. 
45 See para 110. 
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isolation and its relations to Article 3 of the Convention.46 Three terrorists were kept in 
complete isolation from other detainees for a period of three years until they committed 
suicide. The rationale behind this segregation was a fear of their terrorist group, Rote Arme 
Fraktion, engaging in armed attacks. However, they had access to radio, TV and the 
possibility to exercise in fresh air. In addition they were allowed to see each other and to 
have visits. 
 
The Commission pointed out that total isolation might violate the prohibition of torture. 
Under these particular circumstances, taking into consideration that medical reports 
showed no specific health damage resulting from being isolated, the Commission found no 
breach of Article 3.47 
 
Security measures during isolation such as covered windows, continuous camera 
surveillance and lights always being on were under scrutiny in the case of Kröcher and 
Möller vs. Switzerland.48 After a month of imprisonment the heavy security measures were 
lifted and the Commission also here concluded, despite dissenting opinions, with no 
violation of Article 3 of the Convention.49 
 
 
2.2.2 Article 5 
 
With regards to Article 5 of the Convention protecting the right to liberty and security of 
person, an interesting decision was made in the Lawless vs. Ireland case.50 
 
Mr. Lawless, a terrorist suspect, alleged that the Government had violated the Convention 
by detaining him without trial between 13th of July and 11th of December 1957. The Court 
narrowed the question of whether the detention was violating Article 5 down to 
interpreting paragraph 1(c) and 3 as it found the other parts of the Article inapplicable. 
These provisions are worded as follows: 
                                                
46 Application 7572/76, declared inadmissible as “manifestly ill-founded” on 8 July 1978. The Commission 
had the task of reviewing applications before they were submitted to the Court. It does, after the reform 
entering into force 1 November 1998, no longer exist. See Erik Møse; Menneskerettigheter, page 109. 
47 See Erik Møse, Menneskerettigheter, page 220. 
48 Kröcher and Möller vs. Switzerland, 8463/78 DR34 (1982). 
49 See Erik Møse, Menneskerettigheter, pages 220-221. 
50 Lawless vs. Ireland (No.3), Application 332/57, judgement of 1 July 1961. 
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“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law:” 
 
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of 
bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion 
of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered 
necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done 
so; 
 
(3) Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 
(c) of this Article (Art. 5-1-c) shall be brought promptly before a judge or other 
officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial 
within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by 
guarantees to appear for trial.” 
 
In finding that Section 4 of the Irish 1940 Act, which provided the national legislation for 
detaining Mr. Lawless was contrary to the provisions of Article 5, the Court had to 
examine if the case under these particular circumstances could be justified on other legal 
grounds. 
 
In conclusion the Court found that “the Irish Government were justified in declaring that 
there was a public emergency in the Republic of Ireland threatening the life of the nation 
and were hence entitled, applying the provisions of Article 15, paragraph 1 (art. 15-1), of 
the Convention for the purposes for which those provisions were made, to take measures 
derogating from their obligations under the Convention”.51 
 
 
2.2.3 Article 8 
 
The case of Klass and others vs. Germany concerned surveillance on communications as a 
counter-terrorism measure.52 The Court weighed the interest of society and the individual 
against each other, this time in relation to Article 8 of the Convention that guards the right 
to respect for private and family life. Article 8 has the wording as follows: 
 
                                                
51 See para 48 of the judgement. 
52 Klass and others vs. Germany, Application No. 5029/71, judgement of 6 September 1978. 
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“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interest of national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
 
Neither were German authorities obligated to inform persons under surveillance when the 
measures ended, nor was there any judicial control with the procedure. The Court 
established that this constituted an interference with the rights protected by Article 8. 
 
However, the Court acknowledged that the process was in accordance with domestic law, 
restricted by rules of procedure and in pursuit of a legitimate aim, namely national security 
and prevention of disorder or crime. The matter in question was therefore if the 
interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. In the Court’s opinion authorities 
must have a certain, but not unlimited, margin of appreciation in such cases. 
 
After a concrete assessment of the particular circumstances in the case, weighing the 
safeguards against abuse alongside with the nature of the interference, the Court concluded 
with no violation.53 
 
 
 
2.3 Final Comments 
 
 
Significant change has taken place since the Court delivered its verdict in McCann and 
others vs. UK. 
 
Strict measures to prevent terrorism may, as shown by the selection of cases above, be 
taken with the Court’s approval provided that adequate care is ensured. States are given a 
margin of appreciation in dealing with terrorist cases, however, the McCann and others vs. 
UK case shows that this is only to a certain limit. Throughout this perspective it is proven 
by the Court that the world has moved further in its cause against terrorists and their 
                                                
53 See Erik Møse, Menneskerettigheter, pages 407-408. 
 25 
objectives. When reviewing the later judgements by the Court it seems that peace is 
established after the horrific turn of events that took place on Gibraltar during spring 1988. 
 
My opinion is that a necessary legal foundation for the future defeat of terrorism has been 
laid. 
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3 Present Perspective 
 
 
 
3.1 Views on the present situation 
 
 
3.1.1 Use of force and root causes 
 
In the aftermath of 9/11 the commitment to fight terrorism has largely become tantamount 
to the American “war on terror” and expressions as “the axis of evil”. The world has 
witnessed an invasion of Afghanistan as well as the subsequent invasion of Iraq in the 
pursuit of terrorists and terrorist regimes.54 It is fair to characterize the American “war on 
terror” as an outsized part of the terror situation in the world today. 
 
Choosing military force as a response has led to embarrassing and humiliating incidents 
over the last period of years that violate both international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law. The measures taken have to a certain degree corroded the 
values they seek to protect.55 
 
As I briefly commented on in the introduction, valid concerns have been expressed within 
the UN General Assembly on this matter: 56 
 
“Throughout the Panel’s regional consultations, it heard concerns from 
Governments and civil society organizations that the current “war on terrorism” has 
in some instances corroded the very values that terrorists target: human rights and 
the rule of law.  
                                                
54 The political wisdom of such military tactics is not the subject of this thesis. However, I find it relevant in 
relation to the situation today. 
55 For instance scenes shown from the Abu Ghraib prison, obtainable at this website: 
www.antiwar.com/news/?articleid=2444 in addition to reports of detention and interrogation procedures from 
Guantanamo Bay. 
56 See Section B/No. 1/para 147 of the UN reform-suggestion by following this link: 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/terrorism/sg%20high-level%20panel%20report-terrorism.htm 
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Most of those who expressed such concerns did not question the seriousness of the 
terrorist threat and acknowledged that the right to life is the most fundamental of 
human rights. They did, however, express fears that approaches to terror focusing 
wholly on military, police and intelligence measures risk undermining efforts to 
promote good governance and human rights, alienate large parts of the world’s 
population and thereby weaken the potential for collective action against 
terrorism”. 
 
In support of these concerns I also find an American intelligence report released late 
September 2006 stating: 57 
 
“Al-Qa’ida, now merged with Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s network, is exploiting the 
situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors and to maintain its leadership 
role”. 
 
This could possibly be interpreted as an indication of the military tactics at this time being 
only partly successful, if successful at all. It may follow from using merely military force 
to suppress terrorism that terrorists adapt by using other methods or surface in another 
place. Such an outcome is likely when not dealing with the root causes of terrorism, 
resulting in fueling a burning fire. 
 
Presently international organizations, especially the UN and Council of Europe recognize 
the importance of promoting tolerance and cultural understanding in this respect. 
 
The Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, has stated in fear of conflicts spreading:58 
 
"Our global community is experiencing a period of sharply increasing intolerance, 
extremism and violence. Recent developments in the Middle East have only fueled 
this trend. Relations between adherents of major world religions have been 
particularly affected”. 
 
The UN has announced that it is “imperative to develop a global strategy of fighting 
terrorism that addresses root causes and strengthens responsible States and the rule of law 
and fundamental human rights”. 59 
                                                
57 This report was accessible through www.cnn.com. 
58 See the article of Paul Alexander “Annan Calls for Religious Tolerance” by following this link: 
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=2475707 
Mr. Annan is resigning as the UN Secretary General on 1 January 2007 and will be replaced by Ban Ki-
moon. 
59 See Section B/para 148 of the UN document by following this link: 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/terrorism/sg%20high-level%20panel%20report-terrorism.htm 
 28 
Currently, the latest objective in the “war on terror” is to establish a functional democracy 
in Iraq. The goal in itself is admirable. However, I would like to put forward that we are 
interfering with lives of people who, even though some are extremists, are not familiar 
with democracy and consequently have little idea of whether a democracy is better for 
them or not. If the only impression they have of representatives of democracy is the 
western forces, their reluctance is understandable.60 
 
 
3.1.2 Lack of definition 
 
In this complex situation the international community led by the UN is struggling. A clear 
sign of this is the lack of an internationally accepted definition of terrorism. 
 
The above-mentioned UN document, which according to my research is the latest 
development on this topic, states the following:61 
 
“The United Nations must achieve the same degree of normative strength concerning 
the non-State use of force as it has concerning State use of force. Lack of agreement 
on a clear and well-known definition undermines the normative and moral stance 
against terrorism and has stained the United Nations image. Achieving a 
comprehensive convention on terrorism, including a clear definition, is a political 
imperative”. 
 
Evidently, the UN is not content as to where it stands today. 
 
In contrast to this I acknowledge that certain scholars argue that a definition of terrorism 
indeed has developed through several UN conventions, putting forward a view of the 
delimitating of the notion as a main obstacle. Antonio Cassesse emphasizes in this respect 
the definition given in the UN “International Convention for the Suppression on the 
Financing of Terrorism”,62 
 
                                                                                                                                              
In this regard I point out the importance of the UNESCO “Declaration of Principles on Tolerance” (1995) 
and the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 21st of November 2001 “Global Agenda for Dialogue 
among Civilizations”. 
60 Democracy cannot successfully be forced upon those who do not wish it for themselves. 
61 See Section B/No. 4/para 157 and 159 of the UN document in question by following this link: 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/terrorism/sg%20high-level%20panel%20report-terrorism.htm 
62 UNGA resolution 54/109 of 9 December 1999. 
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“any…act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any 
other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed 
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to 
abstain from doing an act.” 
 
In its Suresh judgement the Supreme Court of Canada held this description to “catch the 
essence of what the world understands with terrorism”.63 
 
Presently there seems to be an understanding within the field of law that the following 
three main elements are required before an act constitutes the crime of international 
terrorism:64 
 
Firstly, it is required that the act constitutes a criminal offence under most legal systems. 
Secondly, the aim must be to spread terror, i.e. fear and intimidation, by violent methods or 
threat thereof directed against a State, the public or particular groups of people. Thirdly, 
the act must be politically, religiously or otherwise ideologically motivated. A striking 
feature of terrorism is, as indicated above, the depersonalization of the victim. 
 
Although there is a consensus on the characteristics of terrorism, I hold the view that 
terrorism is insufficiently defined until there exists a comprehensive UN convention that 
includes a definition. 
 
 
 
3.2 International documents released after 9/11 on the fight against 
terrorism 
 
 
3.2.1 The basis 
 
The basis for UN counter-terrorism efforts is the Security Council’s resolution 1373 
                                                
63 Suresh, Canada, Supreme Court, judgement of 11 January 2002. 
See Antonio Cassesse, International Criminal Law, pages 121-122. Lack of definition will be further 
discussed in the Future Perspective, Section 4.1 and 4.2. 
64 See Antonio Cassesse, International Criminal Law, page 124. 
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adopted on 28 September 2001, which among its provisions obliges all States to 
criminalize assistance for terrorist activities, to deny financial support and safe havens and 
to share information about groups planning terrorist attacks. It was also underlined that all 
measures must comply with international human rights. I will in the following present a 
brief overview of international documents released after 9/11 on the fight against terrorism, 
leading towards the present situation. 
 
 
3.2.2 Reports from the Commission on Human Rights 
 
The Commission on Human Rights emphasized in its review of 17 July 2002 that the UN 
reacted swiftly to the events of 9/11 as both the General Assembly and the Security 
Council adopted resolutions on 12 September 2001. These strongly condemn acts of 
terrorism and urgently call upon international co-operation. The report mentions the 
progress in drafting a comprehensive convention on terrorism, “although it came close to 
reaching agreement on the draft comprehensive convention, it could not finalize the few 
remaining articles involving political sensitive matters”.65 
 
The next report from the Commission on Human Rights is dated 25 June 2004 and titled 
“Specific human rights issues: new priorities, in particular terrorism and counter-
terrorism”.66 Again the complexity of issue of terrorism and human rights is emphasized 
along with underlining that dealing with root causes of terrorism is “not only a necessary 
component to understanding terrorism fully, but also to fashioning effective counter-
terrorism measures and policies”. 
 
Problems relating to achieving a precise and generally accepted definition were underlined. 
So were the “…unintended consequences to human rights, and the risk of damage to the 
cause of justice and rule of law…” entailed by the global war on terror and the increased 
“rhetorical use of the expression war on terrorism…, while at the same time providing no 
positive results in combating actual terrorism”. 
 
                                                
65 Document: E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/35 obtainable at this website: 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/terrorism/rapporteur/ See para 23, 25, 26, 27 and 33. 
66 Document: E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/40 obtainable at this website: 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/terrorism/rapporteur/ See para 3, 10, 14, 15, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72 and 74. 
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Addressing the problem of defining the notion, particular attention was given to the 
“freedom fighters issue” whereas the UN Special Rapporteur distinguished between 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law. The agenda has 
“unfortunately become a political rather than a legal and, thus, continue to stand squarely 
in the middle of political controversies…”67 
 
Continuing attention to the “barriers to the effective implementation of extradition 
provisions” was suggested, more specifically with regards to the issue of impunity both for 
State and non-State actors. In addition to the afore-mentioned, the Special Rapporteur 
recommended mechanisms “for periodic review of national counter-terrorism measures…” 
and that States, “refrain from generating undue fear of terrorism”. Special attention was 
recommended to the problem of including criminal acts related neither directly nor 
indirectly to terrorism in national counter-terrorism legislation, hereby not making the 
public safer from terrorist risks.68 
 
Particularly interesting is the report from the Commission on Human Rights dated 11 
August 2004.69 The UN Special Rapporteur for consideration on possible future actions 
prepared “A preliminary framework draft of principles and guidelines concerning human 
rights and terrorism”. Among other principles and guidelines the following were pointed 
out:70 
 
“All international, regional and national action concerning terrorism should be 
guided by the United Nations Charter, all general principles of law, all norms of 
human rights…, and all norms of treaty-based and customary humanitarian law…” 
 
“International action to combat terrorism should, to the degree possible, focus on the 
development and implementation of forward-looking strategies rather than being 
responsive or reflective of individual acts or series of acts of terrorism….” 
 
Furthermore it was emphasized that: 71 
 
                                                
67 The “freedom fighters issue” is still a major obstacle in achieving a generally accepted definition of 
terrorism. 
68 For further information, see in particular para 74. 
69 Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/47 obtainable at this website: 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/terrorism/rapporteur/ 
70 See Document E/CN.4/Sub.2004/47 Section II/A/1 and 3. 
71 See Document E/CN.4/Sub.2004/47 Section II/B and Section II/C/No. 8 obtainable at this website: 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/terrorism/rapporteur/ 
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“All States have a duty to promote and protect human rights… everywhere… All 
States have a duty to protect and promote the safety and security of their people at all 
times. All terrorist acts result in violation of human rights, whether committed by 
States themselves, or sub-State actors. All States have a duty to promote and carry 
out national and international policies and practices to eliminate the causes of 
terrorism and to prevent the occurrence of terrorist acts”. All counter-terrorism 
measures should comply fully with all rules of international law, including human 
rights… law…” 
 
These quotations catch the essence of my thesis. Moreover, the statement that “all States 
have a duty to protect and promote the safety and security of their people at all times”, 
provides an interesting parallel to the “Osman-doctrine” established by the Court sitting as 
a Grand Chamber in its Osman vs. UK judgement.72 According to the “Osman-doctrine”, 
which relates to Article 2 of the Convention, it must be established “that the authorities 
knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to 
the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and 
that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers, which judged 
reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk”.73 
 
 
3.2.3 Other UN-documents 
 
Following up the considerations by the UN Special Rapporteur the Security Council 
adopted resolution 1566 on 8 October 2004. This resolution is largely based on many of 
the recommendations quoted above in addition to:74 
 
“establish a working group consisting of all members of the Security Council to 
consider and submit recommendations to the Council on practical measures to be 
imposed upon individuals, groups or entities involved in or associated with terrorist 
activities, other than those designated by the Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions 
Committee, including more effective procedures considered appropriate for 
bringing them to justice…” 
 
Once again enhanced international co-operation is called upon along with the prevention of 
movement of terrorists and the freezing of their financial assets. Furthermore, the UN 
expressed that it will not tolerate acts of terrorism by outlining five pillars, the so-called 
                                                
72 Osman vs. UK, 87/1997/871/1083, 28 October 1998. 
73 Osman vs. UK, 87/1997/871/1083, 28 October 1998, see para 116 of the judgement. 
74 See S/RES/1566 (2004) Section 3 No. 9 
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five D’s, of a counter-terrorism strategy. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan hereby 
underlined the importance of: 75 
 
“dissuading people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it, denying terrorists 
the means to carry out an attack, deterring States from supporting terrorism, 
developing State capacity to defeat terrorism and defending human rights”. 
 
He addressed the need for clarity and that the international community speaks with one 
voice, and added: 76 
 
“Our goal should be to reduce the appeal of terrorism by reclaiming the sanctity of 
the civilian and according to justice, dignity and compassion to victims”. 
 
More recently, on 8 September 2006, the UN General Assembly adopted the Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy including a plan of action.77 The plan of action represents a 
summary of where the UN stands today. 
 
Terrorism is to be considered as one of the most serious threats to international peace and 
security resulting in that the Member States resolve: “to consistently, unequivocally and 
strongly condemn terrorism… and to make every effort to reach an agreement on and 
conclude a comprehensive convention on international terrorism”.78 
 
In the same document the UN asked for Member States to “implement all General 
Assembly resolutions…” and “Security Council resolutions related to terrorism…” while 
recognizing “that international cooperation and any measures we undertake to prevent and 
combat terrorism must comply with our obligations under… in particular human rights 
law…”.79 The Member States “must develop and maintain an effective and rule of law-
based national criminal justice system… with due respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms…” establishing terrorist acts as “…serious criminal offences in 
domestic laws…”80 
 
                                                
75 See United Nations A/60/825 General Assembly, 06-33088 (E) 010506, “Uniting against terrorism”, 
Report of the Secretary General, Introduction para 1. 
76 See See United Nations A/60/825 General Assembly, 06-33088 (E) 010506, Section II/A/ para 13. 
77 Obtainable at this website: http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy/ 
78 See the Annex, Plan of Action, No. 1 and 2 a by following this link: http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy/ 
79 See the Annex, Plan of Action, No. 2 b, c and 3. 
80 See the Annex, Plan of Action, Section IV, No. 4. 
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In other words, the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy defines a platform which all 
Member States must derive their counter-terrorism efforts from and that “defending human 
runs like a scarlet thread through” such measures.81 
 
 
3.2.4 Other international documents related to preventing and combating terrorism 
 
In accordance with the views presented by the UN is the “Guidelines of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe on human rights and the fight against terrorism” dated 
11 July 2002. Here the same condemnation of “all acts, methods and practices of 
terrorism” is stated and that “it is not only possible, but absolutely necessary, to fight 
terrorism while respecting human rights…”82 
 
Along with the lines drawn by the Court in the afore-mentioned Osman vs. UK judgement 
this document restates every States’ obligation to take appropriate measures to “protect the 
fundamental rights of everyone within their jurisdiction…, especially the right to life”.83 
 
Such measures must “respect human rights and the principle of rule of law, while 
excluding any form of arbitrariness… and be subjected to “appropriate supervision”. The 
lawfulness of appropriate measures is absolutely imperative.84 These guidelines also 
reaffirm the importance of Article 3 of the Convention by unconditionally prohibiting “the 
use of torture or of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment…, in all 
circumstances…”85 
 
Article 8 of the Convention is also duly respected by restricting competent authorities in 
the field of State security, demanding that efforts made by such authorities are provided for 
by law and subject to supervision by an external independent authority.86 
 
                                                
81 Quoted from the UN Secretary General’s statement, obtainable at 
http://www.un.org/unitingagainstterrorism/sgstatement.html 
82 See b and c of the Preamble. 
83 See “Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on human rights and the fight 
against terrorism”, para I. 
84 See para II, III. 
85 See para IV. 
86 See para VI, No. 1. 
 35 
Furthermore, the guidelines present a view consistent with the Court’s case law on Articles 
5 and 6 of the Convention, respectively the right to liberty and security and right to a fair 
trial, hereby including pre-trial detention, legal proceedings and the incurring of 
penalties.87 
 
The final guideline I would like to point out here is in relation to extradition, which is “an 
essential procedure for effective international co-operation in the fight against terrorism.”88 
 
Of relevance is also, in my opinion, the “Declaration on freedom of expression and 
information in the media in the context of the fight against terrorism” adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 2 March 2005. In this regard they 
called on the Member States “not to introduce any new restrictions on freedom of 
expression… unless strictly necessary and proportionate in a democratic society and…” if 
the “existing laws or other measures are not already sufficient”.  
 
Moreover, public authorities must “refrain from adopting measures equating media 
reporting on terrorism with support for terrorism” and “ensure that access by journalists to 
information regularly updated, in particular by appointing spokespersons and organizing 
press conferences”. 
 
A highly important aspect in the same document is that Member States must “provide 
appropriate information to the media with due respect for the principle of the presumption 
of innocence and the right to respect for private life”. With due respect for Articles 6 and 8 
of the Convention public authorities must also “guarantee the right of the media to know 
the charges brought by the judicial authorities, against persons who are the subject of anti-
terrorist judicial proceedings, as well as the right to follow these proceedings and to report 
on them”. 89 
 
In this document the Committee of Ministers agreed “to monitor… the initiatives taken by 
governments… in particular in the legal field, to fight terrorism as far as they could affect 
the freedom of the media”. In the context of protecting the right to a fair trial it seems that 
                                                
87 See para VIII, IX, and X of the Guidelines. 
88 See para XIII, No. 1. 
89 See page 4 of the document. 
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the idea of separate trial systems for terrorist suspects and other criminal suspects is 
abandoned internationally.90 Turkey, for instance, had until recently a dual-procedure 
system that was abolished after proven less effective than anticipated on top of the 
Convention-related problems. An increased tendency in Member States to adopt 
administrative measures was noted, from which the possibility that the aim is to 
circumvent the high procedural guarantees of criminal proceedings cannot be totally 
excluded. Therefore, the afore-mentioned document stated: “the standards laid down in the 
Guidelines should be applicable in all sorts of proceedings in which a person is designated 
as a terrorist suspect”. 
 
In this document it is also suggested that “the use of intelligence materials in criminal trials 
will be made possible by way of adopting the system used for anonymous witnesses”. 
 
 
 
3.3 Analysis 
 
 
The above-mentioned initiatives are to be welcomed as intelligent adaptations to a world 
dealing with ruthless terrorists in a time of massive cultural misunderstandings. Even so, I 
find it tempting to compare the present international situation to the case of McCann and 
others vs. UK that is analyzed in the Past Perspective of this thesis.91 
 
The excessive use of force committed by armed forces today is strikingly similar to that of 
the British SAS soldiers in 1988.92 
 
In both cases use of force comes as a result of insufficiently verified information passed on 
from a higher level.93 This “lacks the degree of caution in the use of firearms to be 
expected from law-enforcement personnel in a democratic society, even when dealing with 
                                                
90 See “Workshop 2 sheet” courtesy of Prof. dr. Martin Kuijer, Dutch Ministry of Justice. 
91 McCann and others vs. UK, Series A324 18984/91, judgement of 27 September 1995. 
92 The armed forces are largely employed by USA. 
93 With regards to Osama Bin Laden’s whereabouts in Afghanistan and the “weapons of mass destruction” 
issue in Iraq. The difficulty of verifying such information is not questioned. See McCann and others vs. UK, 
Past Perspective, Section 2.1.3. 
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dangerous terrorist suspects”, and also suggests “a lack of appropriate care in the control 
and organization of the arrest operation”, as announced by the Court in its McCann and 
others vs. UK judgement. 
 
The former quote addresses the use of force today while the latter symbolizes the lack of 
international co-operation. Since a comprehensive convention including a generally 
accepted definition of terrorism, which is the goal of the UN, is currently not achieved, one 
may say that there still are significant steps to be taken. 
 
During the writing of my thesis, the actuality of the matter has been refuelled through the 
passing of an anti-terror law in USA. It has been severely criticized for not fulfilling the 
obligations previously referred to in the fight against terrorism.94 
 
 
In conclusion, this leaves at present an impression of the international community as not 
duly capable of dealing effectively and unequivocally with the threat posed by terrorism. 
                                                
94 This law allows detention of persons indefinitely without opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of it in 
court. A person on trial may be convicted and put to death on the basis of coerced testimony. See the 
following link: http://edition.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/10/17/bush.terrorism.ap/index.html. 
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3.4 The practicability of international principles and guidelines 
 
 
3.4.1 National implementations 
 
The last Norwegian report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) on implementation 
of UN resolution 1373 shows that there has been taken considerable action to establish and 
strengthen legislative measures against acts of terrorism. The main relevant provision is 
§147 (a) of the Norwegian Penal Code, which also contains a quite similar description of 
acts of terrorism as given in the above-mentioned Suresh judgement. 
 
The Norwegian Penal Code has a broad range of provisions that target participation in 
terrorist activities. For instance, according to its § 104 (a) it is prohibited to form, take part 
in, recruit members to, or support terrorist groups or private organizations of military 
character. 
 
An important aspect of terrorism is the matter of financing in which several techniques are 
used to avoid detection by the authorities. Most countries have taken significant steps to 
suppress the most common offence in this regard, that is to say the crime of money 
laundering. A person financing a terrorist act is under Norwegian law in principle 
considered to be an accomplice to the act itself. Furthermore there is also criminal liability 
attached to making funds, financial assets or other financial services available to terrorists. 
Freezing of any property belonging to any person or entity is the main preventive tool 
given under domestic legislation in this aspect of combating terrorism. €272,128,66 were 
frozen in the Netherlands in 2005.95 
 
In Norway both financial and non-financial institutions, the former also has a duty to 
establish adequate control routines, are obliged to look into and report suspicious 
transactions to the National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and 
Environmental Crime (ØKOKRIM). This authority may then, if considered necessary, 
deny the institution to carry out the transaction. 
 
The Netherlands have chosen another method by establishing an independent 
                                                
95 See United Nations S/2005/425 30 June 2005, Question 1.2. 
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administrative body within the organizational structure of the Ministry of Justice, the 
Unusual Transactions Reporting Centre, which focuses both on money laundering and 
other ways of financing terrorism.96 
 
In France there is no punishment connected to omission of reporting suspicious transaction 
per se, while in Norway a financial institution shall of its own motion and without 
notifying the client or a third party report information suggesting that a transaction may be 
linked with terrorist activities. 97 The main responsibility of reporting money transfers into 
and out of the country lies on the Central Bank of Norway. In order to be able to follow up 
and deal effectively with such reports a new pattern of co-operation has been established 
between ØKOKRIM, the National Bureau of Crime Investigation (KRIPOS) and the 
Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), hereby combining expert knowledge from 
different fields. Close co-operation and regular sharing of information has proven 
invaluable. 
 
Severe problems for monitoring the movement of money are posed by informal banking 
systems such as “Hawala” despite the fact that they are considered unlawful in most 
countries.98 These systems may facilitate the channelling of money for terrorist purposes. 
Investigations have led to a number of people in Norway being charged with money 
laundering and by regulations governing accountancy, currency transfer or taxation.99 
 
A big public safety issue is to prevent that neither illicit nor legitimate weapons fall into 
the wrong hands. In Norway a licence is required for all trade in weapons and military 
equipment, in addition acquiring and possessing a firearm requires permission from the 
police. Privately owned firearms must in some cases be kept in approved gun lockers, 
while the police must receive notification when firearms are lost or stolen.100 
 
Closely related to terrorist issues are the immigration policies. 
 
                                                
96 See United Nations S/2005/425 30 June 2005 Question 1.1. 
97 See United Nations S/2002/791 19 July 2002 Section A - sub-paragraph 1 (c). 
98 Hawala is a type of Informal Value Transfer System that is not criminal per se. A hawaladar is responsible 
for the sending and payment, while intermediaries handle the settlement process. See “Global Organized 
Crime…”, pages 149-158. 
99 See United Nations S/2002/791 19 July 2002, Section B - paragraph 4. 
100 See United Nations S/2002/791 19 July 2002, Section B - sub-paragraph 2 (a). 
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Firstly, foreign nationals are rejected, expelled or refused permit under the Immigration 
Act given that there are serious suspicions of this person having violated certain provisions 
of the Penal Code.101 This is in accordance with the exclusion clause of the Refugee 
Convention and is practised as a general rule by the Member States. However, such 
persons cannot be sent to areas where they may fear persecution. 
 
Secondly, border control becomes in this regard important for denying terrorists’ entrance 
or residency in a country. This has resulted in enhanced control routines in several 
countries aimed at harmonizing customs procedures. Especially in Eastern Europe 
increasing efforts are being made to detect counterfeit travel documents. There is a 
growing tendency of mutual assistance between Member States for instance in 
investigative training and electronic equipment. Finally, intelligence information is 
exchanged in order to deny terrorists safe havens. 
 
Thirdly, the issue of extradition is in Norway regulated by international agreements. 
Norway must be obliged to extradite under the agreement and the offence in question has 
to be of certain gravity. The latter limitation will not materialize in relation to terrorist 
offences. 
 
In addition to regular imprisonment Norwegian courts may impose a detention not 
confined to a limited amount of time when the former is considered inadequate to protect 
society from the perpetrator. This form of indefinite deprivation of liberty requires that the 
perpetrator has committed a serious crime and hereby endangered the life, health or 
freedom of others. The likelihood of re-offending is an important consideration. Given the 
strong intent to cause harm and the gravity in general related to terrorist offences, it is 
likely that Norway will make use of this alternative detention when dealing with acts of 
terrorism.102 
 
Terrorist entities are proven to have relations with organized crime.103 By taking measures 
to combat organized crime one may for that reason be able to uncover certain aspects of 
terrorism as well. 
                                                
101 Norwegian Penal Code, see §147 (a) and (b). 
102 See United Nations S/2002/791 19 July 2002, Section B - sub-paragraph 2 (e). 
103 For further discussion see Future Perspective, Section 4.4. 
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In this respect Norway has introduced several practical measures involving co-operation 
between different authorities aimed at preventing transnational organized crime. 
 
According to Norway’s report this has led directly to better infiltration of the underworld. 
Concerns and views relating to combating organized crime have been presented 
internationally, both within the Schengen co-operation and other bodies.104 
 
Besides agreements on crime prevention and mutual assistance in criminal matter with 
other Nordic countries, Russia and the European Union, Norway and the Organization of 
African Unity have agreed on a support programme for implementing UN resolution 1373. 
 
France replies to the UN in its report concerning the implementation of UN resolution 
1373, on the importance of protection programmes available to those who are dealing with 
terrorist cases. For instance judges, law-enforcement personnel, witnesses and persons 
willing to provide information. These may enjoy different forms of protection or can also 
make use of borrowed identities, whereas disclosure of the latter is subject to severe 
punishment.105 
 
As a summary, important steps have been taken on national level in the time after 9/11. 
The Counter-Terrorism Committee has figured as a co-ordinator. 
 
 
3.4.2 Recent judgements on terrorism 
 
 
3.4.2.1 Article 3 
In Sevtap Veznedaroglu vs. Turkey the protection given by Article 3 was in question.106 
Sevtap Veznedaroglu, married to a lawyer and a former “president” of a local human rights 
organization, alleged that she had been subjected to torture in custody of Turkish police. 
Under suspicion of taking part in activities related to the PKK, she was arrested by the 
police, and later blindfolded and interrogated by fifteen police officers. During the 
                                                
104 See United Nations S/2002/791 19 July 2002, Section B - sub-paragraph 2 (g). 
105 See United Nations S/2004/226 29 March 2004, para 1.8 
106 Sevtap Veznedaroglu vs. Turkey, Application No. 32357/96, judgment of 11 April 2000. See Section 
2.2.1 of this thesis for the text of Article 3. 
 42 
interrogation she was undressed, hung up after her arms and given electrical shocks to her 
mouth and genitals. Furthermore, in the first two days of detention she was denied food. 
The woman was also forced, under threats of being raped and killed, to sign papers stating 
that here bruises resulted from a fall.107 
 
The Court stated that Article 3 protects one of the Convention’s most fundamental values 
and may not be derogated from, even in exceptional situations were the life of a nation is 
threatened.108 This case concerned difficult evidential questions as the wounds inflicted 
were not followed up by Turkish authorities. The Court’s opinion was that Turkish 
authorities should have undertaken investigations in order to uncover whether Sevtap 
Veznedaroglu was subjected to torture or not. Particularly, the Court pointed out that the 
Turkish State Security Court concluded that torture had taken place, but did not follow up 
on the case. 
 
Article 3 was violated as a result of insufficient scrutiny by Turkish authorities when 
presented with a case of well-founded allegations of torture.109  
 
 
3.4.2.2 Article 5 
Pre-trial detention was the subject in the case of O’Hara vs. UK.110 British authorities 
acting under the 1984 Prevention of Terrorism Act arrested Gerard O’Hara, a terrorist 
suspect and an important member of Sinn Fein. In the Court’s opinion the suspicion was 
reasonable under the circumstances of the case and found that domestic law sufficiently 
safeguarded the citizens against arbitrary detention.111 
 
The Court concluded with violation of Article 5(3), protecting liberty and security of 
person, as O’Hara was held in pre-trial detention for six days and thirteen hours.112 Even in 
difficult cases involving terrorism, the Court had previously found that six days of 
detention without judicial review was in breach of the Convention. O’Hara was not 
“brought promptly before a judge” or had his “trial within a reasonable time”. 
                                                
107 See para 12-13 of the judgement. 
108 See para 28. 
109 See para 33-35. 
110 O’Hara vs. UK, Application No. 37555/97, judgement of 16 October 2001. 
111 See para 42, 44 of the judgement. See Section 2.2.2 of this thesis for the text of Article 5. 
112 See para 46. 
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3.4.2.3 Article 8 
In the case of Segerstedt-Wiberg and others vs. Sweden question arose whether partly 
denial of access to personal records in the archive of Swedish security police constituted a 
breach of Articles 8, 10, 11 and 13 of the Convention.113 
 
The Court recognized the need for intelligence services in a democratic society, but 
reaffirmed the duty to confine the use thereof to a level of strictly necessary. It 
acknowledged that the keeping and the denial of full access to such intelligence records in 
principle amounted to an interference with the right to private life under Article 8. 
 
Article 8 was not breached in the case of Segerstedt-Wiberg concerning the keeping of 
such records, as the Court concluded that the interference with her privacy was not 
disproportionate with the aim to protect society against terrorism. Conversely, the 
interference was not proportionate concerning the others, as it did not meet the criteria 
“necessary in a democratic society” due to lack of concrete evidence.114 As all States have 
a certain margin of appreciation in dealing with the terrorist threat, the Court did not 
question Sweden’s decision to deny full access to personal records and concluded with no 
breach of Article 8 on this matter.115 
 
 
 
3.5 Final comments 
 
 
Holding together the present international situation, the effort made on national level and 
recent judgements from the Court draws a picture of a forward-moving world in its fight 
against terrorism. Important human rights issues have been dealt with while seeking to 
achieve sufficient preventive measures. The Court has given a limited margin of 
                                                
113 Segerstedt-Wiberg and others vs. Sweden, Application No. 62332/00, judgement of 6 June 2006. The 
main focus is on Article 8. See Section 2.2.3 of this thesis for the text of this Article. 
114 See para 92 of the judgement. 
115 See para 104. 
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appreciation to States in handling the terrorist threat. A strict rule in this regard is based on 
the belief that human rights must be protected when facing not only terrorism, but crime in 
general. 
 
It is, in my view, important to remember that terrorism is nothing else than a criminal act, 
however serious it may be. Elevating the value of a terrorist act brings more difficulty to 
the efforts of combating this phenomenon. A distinction between terrorism and 
declarations or acts of war is crucial. Terrorism is a criminal offence that national 
authorities must learn to cope with. Due to the enormous potential destruction connected to 
war one should save any link to terms of such hostilities to the true situations of armed 
conflict. It is therefore imperative that legislators, judicial authorities, law-enforcement 
agencies and the democratic society in general keep its cool, so to speak. The threat posed 
by terrorism cannot justify violation of human rights based on the mere fact that we 
consider it to be a more serious crime than others. If so, we have reached the end of the 
scope of our fundamental principles already, which leaves them with a severely reduced 
value. 
 
Intelligence services, when restricted to the lowest possible level, have been accepted by 
the Court as necessary in a democratic society.116 Evidently, this is a preventive measure of 
crucial importance in relation to terrorism of which we have not yet seen the full scope. At 
present the Court has set a frame for what is an acceptable level of interference with the 
above-mentioned human rights, however, an exact dimension is unlikely to be achieved 
due to the living nature of the Convention. The goal must therefore be to narrow this frame 
down sufficiently to create clearer lines and standards for behaviour in fighting terrorism. 
By its nature this can only be achieved by a certain trying and failing period corrected by 
institutions such as the Court. It is apparent that this cannot go on indefinitely, hereby 
realizing that at present we are neither at the beginning of this process nor close to the end. 
 
In relation to this one must call attention to the fact that terrorism, as a phenomenon, does 
not stand still. As any other criminal willing to commit a crime, a terrorist will adapt to 
preventive measures taken by society. This is the fact that always will make the rule of law 
reactive, a nature difficult to compensate for. 
                                                
116 For further discussion see Future Perspective, Section 4.3. 
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Comparing the image of this Present Perspective to the one of the Past Perspective, the 
democracies have succeeded in continuing to build on the legal framework that was 
previously established. Sadly, the savage mentality represented by the “fire vs. fire” policy 
is still apparent through the “war on terror”. The progress of developing a sufficient legal 
framework is stained, of which the full scope has not yet manifested itself, when a 
representative for democracy engages in excessive use of force against terrorists or 
terrorist suspects. 
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4. Future Perspective 
 
 
 
4.1. The problems ahead 
 
 
The reactive nature of law is a weak spot for combating terrorism. Merely prohibiting or 
criminalizing terrorism, or other offences for that matter, does not prevent a terror attack 
from taking place. 
 
In particular with facing terror threats the odds are not good for a democratic state 
considering that a terrorist only needs one successful attempt, while the state ideally should 
have a prevention-rate of one hundred percent. Therefore, I hold the view that the legal 
approach to defeat terrorism is to employ adequate preventive measures through 
legislation. 
 
However, I cannot strongly enough call attention to the fact that this is an area were 
legislators need to have a wide perspective. For legal tools to work properly, co-operation 
with other fields is necessary. In this regard I underline especially the need for promoting 
tolerance and cultural understanding and protecting freedom of expression. Although 
nearly all expressions are protected by the freedom of expression, the Norwegian Supreme 
Court judgement in the case of Kjuus shows that the freedom is not unlimited.117 To obtain 
the right balance between these separate frameworks is crucial. 
 
It is urgent that the world speaks with one voice when facing terrorism.118 Condemnation 
by the international community is absolutely necessary, but insufficient alone. In this 
respect I would like to stress the imperative need for a comprehensive convention 
                                                
117 See Rt. 1997/14 
118 Stressed more generally by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in dealing with the escalated nuclear 
situation in North Korea. 
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including a definition of terrorism that is internationally agreed upon. As previously 
recognized, scholars argue that there already exists a definition developed through UN 
conventions and that the problem lies in delimitating the notion.119 
 
However, bearing in mind that the UN itself is not content with the present situation it 
becomes clear that there is still a step to take. According to an UN document it weakens 
the image of the UN not to be able to take a clear stand in addressing terrorism: 120 
 
“The United Nations ability to develop a comprehensive strategy has been 
constrained by the inability of Member States to agree on an anti -terrorism 
convention including a definition of terrorism… The search for an agreed definition 
usually stumbles on two issues. 
The first is the argument that any definition should include States’ use of armed 
forces against civilians. We believe that the legal and normative framework against 
State violations is far stronger than in the case of non-State actors and we do not 
find this objection to be compelling. 
The second objection is that peoples under foreign occupation have a right to 
resistance and a definition of terrorism should not override this right. The right to 
resistance is contested by some. But it is not the central point: the central point is 
that there is nothing in the fact of occupation that justifies the targeting and killing 
of civilians.  
Neither of these objections is weighty enough to contradict the argument that the 
strong, clear normative framework of the United Nations surrounding State use of 
force must be complemented by a normative framework of equal authority 
 surrounding non -State use of force. 
Attacks that specifically target innocent civilians and non -combatants must be 
condemned clearly and unequivocally by all”. 
 
I sincerely concur with the view just presented, as it is time to put the political differences 
that have surrounded the environment behind and develop a comprehensive convention by 
focusing on the crucial point, the attacking of civilians. In my opinion the obstacles 
mentioned in the quote above vanish when focusing on the protective side in forming a 
definition. A definition of terrorism should therefore be build upon a platform with 
protection of civilians and non-combatants in peacetime as the main feature. 
 
 
 
                                                
119 See Present Perspective, Section 3.1. 
120 See para 156 and 160 of the UN document obtainable at this website: 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/terrorism/sg%20high-level%20panel%20report-terrorism.htm 
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4.2 Aiming at an internationally accepted definition of terrorism 
 
 
I would like to present the following as an attempt of a possible definition of terrorism that 
could be accepted internationally: 
 
Any person or entity that performs or threatens to perform an act, which under civilized 
legal systems constitutes an offence, directed at a State, the public or a particular group of 
people, hereby targeting anyone not taking part in the hostilities of national or 
international armed conflict, with the aim to spread actual or potential fear and 
intimidation in order to achieve a vision driven by political, religious or otherwise 
ideological motivations, is guilty of the crime of terrorism. 
 
The focuses of this definition lie in identifying the victim, establishing the aims of and the 
driving motivations for the act or threat thereof, and hereby decide whether it constitutes a 
terrorist offence. Accordingly, neither is it in principle necessary to take into consideration 
by whom the act is committed nor if the act committed is of a certain character in order to 
assess if the crime in question amounts to terrorism. The “freedom-fighter issue” is 
avoided as freedom fighters are not condemned per se, only those who make use of 
terrorist methods. 
 
Moreover, this definition means that terrorism also may be committed by other than 
violent means, for instance by launching a computer virus breaking down the banking 
system as we know it, hereby throwing the world into chaos. Instead of specifying the act 
in any way, focus is on the following affect. By approaching terrorism in such manners one 
in addition leaves open the possibility of committing purely mental terror, as there is no 
absolute criteria of bodily injury. 
 
To balance the scale as to which act is grave enough to constitute terrorism, consideration 
is to be given when assessing the created “actual or potential fear and intimidation” and if 
the act or threat thereof is “directed at a State, the public or particular group of people”. 
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Continuing to clearly distinguish terrorism from other crimes, this definition recognizes all 
the three main features of terrorism that are internationally agreed upon.121 
 
The essential factors are that the act or threat is aimed at spreading fear and intimidation, 
ideologically motivated and targeting “anyone not taking part in the hostilities of …armed 
conflict”.122 Entailed by the latter is that anyone, except representatives of combating 
forces in armed conflict, may be a victim of terrorism as a criminal offence under 
international human rights law subject to judicial pursuance. 
 
Since representatives of armed forces, along with civilians and non-combatants already are 
protected in armed conflict under international humanitarian law, which prohibits the use 
of terrorist methods, a distinction between peacetime and situations of armed conflict is 
permitted. Consequently, in harmonizing the relationship between international human 
rights and humanitarian law, attention must be given to how the latter defines the actual 
parties in armed conflict and ensure that persons not protected hereby enjoy protection 
provided by international human rights law. 
 
The rationale behind the afore-mentioned attempt to define terrorism is highly inspired by 
the need for forward-looking strategies. Legislators must in the future meet the challenge 
of converting such strategies into hard law. However, it is vital to realize that these 
strategies not automatically are compatible with the standards set by the Court. Therefore, 
in order not to achieve the same affect by legal as by violent means, one must strike the 
fine balance between counter-terrorism measures and international human rights. 
                                                
121 See Present Perspective, Section 3.1. 
122 The full scope of “armed conflict” should be scrutinized under international humanitarian law. 
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4.3 Counter-terrorism measures and international human rights 
 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
As shown through this thesis the Court has repeatedly stated that even when up against 
dangerous terrorists, states only have a certain margin of appreciation in interfering with 
the human rights established by the Convention. 
 
On the other hand, this margin of appreciation lacks an exact dimension due to in 
particular two factors: 
Firstly, the Convention is a living instrument and must be understood to have a dynamic 
and developing nature. 
Secondly, a decision of whether or not an action taken constitutes a breach of obligations 
under the Convention is always dependent on the particular circumstances of the case. 
 
The question remains, until Court has further signalized which measures are appreciated or 
not, which legal and violent methods a State can employ in the interest of preventing 
terrorism. In the following I will present an overview of considerations largely based on 
the Court’s Jurisprudence in relation to Article 2, 3, 5 and 8 of the Convention. 
 
 
4.3.2 Article 2 
 
Article 2 of the Convention protecting the right to life has already been elaborated on 
thoroughly by the Court, resulting in relatively clear standards for which counter-terrorism 
measures that are acceptable. 
 
The case of McCann and others vs. UK provides valuable information in this respect. 
Through this verdict it is clear that a State is permitted to make use of lethal force given 
that it is absolutely necessary. However, one must keep in mind that the latter 
measurement depends on the particular circumstances of the case. At the same time it is 
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imperative to avoid that the use of lethal force by State agents becomes an alternative 
manner of carrying out a death penalty. This entails that restrictions on use of lethal force 
are ineffective without judicial review. Respectively Protocol 6 and Protocol 13 to the 
Convention abolish both in peacetime and under all circumstances the death penalty. 
 
This means that terrorists guilty of the most heinous act are neither to be subjected to the 
death penalty nor extradited to countries were they might face such punishment. Lethal 
force, due to the fact that Article 2 protects one of the most fundamental values of the 
Convention, should be employed with the highest level of care in combating terrorism. 
Intentional killing by the State is a flammable issue that easily might lead to refuelling an 
ongoing conflict, especially when bearing in mind the extremism involved. It would be a 
critical step back to repeat the mistakes experienced in the case of McCann and others vs. 
UK. In principle, lethal force should in the future be a last resort in combating terrorism 
considering that it does not solve the problem in hand on long terms. 
 
 
4.3.3 Article 3 
 
The prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment established 
through the Article 3 of the Convention is of great relevance to the issue of terrorism and 
international human rights. In particular the situation of interrogation is subject to 
intriguing questions in this respect. 
 
The conduct of interrogators is regulated through this Article as it limits what a terrorist 
suspect, as all other suspects, may be subjected to during in custody of authorities. 
Throughout the Court’s case law the content of Article 3 has evolved in both defining the 
terms and establishing the scope. Firstly, the prohibition against torture is absolute. 
Secondly, a conduct must be of a certain seriousness, of which the assessment must take 
into consideration all circumstances of the case hereby resulting in interpretation of the 
Article as a sliding scale, in order to constitute a violation of Article 3.123 Thirdly, the 
Court has weighted the Convention as a living instrument in its interpretation of Article 3, 
                                                
123 Ireland vs. UK, 18 January 1978, Series A, No. 25; (1979-80) 2EHRR25 para 162. 
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hereby meaning that conduct previously not classified as torture may be classified 
differently in the future.124 
 
Torture was in the case of Ireland vs. UK defined as “deliberate inhuman treatment causing 
very serious and cruel suffering”.125 Inhuman treatment does not necessarily have to be 
deliberate, but must meet a minimum level of severity. Degrading treatment has the 
humiliation or arousing of fear as its main feature, however, the Court has classified 
conduct as degrading treatment also were the humiliation was unintended.126 
 
The Court has found, while taking into consideration the duration of the treatment along 
with its physical and mental effects, the sex, age and victim’s state of health, that, among 
other incidents, the following is to be considered in breach with Article 3: beatings, mock 
executions, electric shocks, covering of heads with hoods, long-time standing with limbs 
outstretched, subjection to intense noise, deprivation of sleep, diet of bread and water, 
“Palestinian hanging”, imposing death penalty after an unfair trial, and also racial 
discrimination.127 
 
Methods of interrogation as mentioned above may not be employed with expectancy of 
approval from the Court. Interrogators and investigators must seek other manners in order 
to obtain the wished information from terrorist suspects. There are methods, such as for 
instance psychological “tricks”, which do not cause any suffering compared to the afore-
mentioned, but where the morality of is still highly questionable. 
 
The complications involved in obtaining information through interrogation due to its 
nature, while duly respecting Article 3, entail that more efforts could favourably be 
allocated to the aspect of investigation and gathering of hard evidence. In other words, in 
preventing terrorism this is likely to entail a high level of intelligence services. 
 
 
                                                
124 Selmouni vs. France (App.25803/94), 28 July 1999, 29EHRR403, para 101. 
125 Ireland vs. UK, Application No. 5310/71, judgement of 18 January 1978, para 167. 
126 Peers vs. Greece (App.28524/95), 19 April 2001, 33EHRR1192. 
127 See Jacobs & White “The European Convention on Human Rights”, fourth edition, pages 74-83. 
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4.3.4 Article 5 
 
With regards to Article 5 protecting liberty and security of person, the pre-trial detention 
alternative instituted by Article 5(1)(c) is relevant in discussing the prevention of terrorism. 
The Court has already set standards for lawful pre-trial detention. For instance, which 
could be of relevancy to the issue of terrorism; the preventive detention of individuals 
considered as unwanted elements in society is a violation of Article 5(1)(c). 
 
Moreover, the duration of pre-trial detention has been under scrutiny by the Court on 
several occasions and although there has not been developed an exact dimension relating to 
such detention, certain guidelines have been established throughout the Court’s case law. 
Taking all particular circumstances of the case into consideration in the judgement of 
Brogan and others vs. UK, the Court ruled that a detention of four days and six hours 
constituted a violation of Article 5(3).128 
 
An alternative method of depriving suspects of their liberty could be to confine their 
possibility of movement to wanted areas, for instance by electronic surveillance or 
notification systems. However, it is questionable whether this is a justifiable measure 
against potentially dangerous terrorist suspects who one must assume are quite likely to be 
able to adapt to such a situation. Once again it seems that the gathering of intelligence at an 
earlier stage is of crucial importance. 
 
 
4.3.5 Article 8 
 
In my opinion Article 8 is therefore of specific interest in relation to the prevention of 
terrorism. Since gathering and keeping of intelligence information is by the Court 
considered as an interference with the right to respect for private and family life, counter-
terrorism measures are likely to be scrutinized under Article 8. Obtaining personal 
information including recordings and photographs under anti-terrorist legislation will often 
be judged as necessary in the interest of preventing crime. On the other hand and as shown 
                                                
128 Brogan and others vs. UK 29 November 1988, Series A, No.145-B;(1989) 11EHRR117. See Jacobs & 
White “The European Convention on Human Rights”, fourth edition, pages 123-132. 
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above, the Court is not reluctant to classify disproportionate measures as violations of the 
right to respect for private life. 
 
The assessment of whether the interference amounts to a breach of this right or not, given 
that the other conditions are met, is mostly based on if the measure can be considered as 
necessary in a democratic society. Under this heading the existence of safeguards against 
abuse is an important consideration. 
 
In the case of Klass and others vs. Germany regarding telephone interceptions, the Court 
found that the German law on surveillance, which provided judicial control by an “official 
qualified for judicial office” and not by a judge in addition to no obligation to notify the 
person under surveillance after the event, because of sufficient safeguards against abuse 
was in conformity with Article 8.129 
 
In Leander vs. Sweden the Court found no violation of Article 8 concerning the fact that 
the secret police kept records after a personnel control procedure applicable to Swedish 
navy employees.130 As a result of this control procedure the applicant was found unsuitable 
for certain positions. The Court ruled that the interference was in accordance with a 
sufficiently clear and accessible law, sufficient safeguards existed, and allowed the State a 
wide margin of appreciation in the question of national security. 
 
The Court assessed the use of security cameras in Perry vs. UK where it stated that “…the 
normal use of security cameras per se whether in the public street or on premises, such as 
shopping centres or police stations where they serve a legitimate and foreseeable purpose, 
do not raise issues under Article 8…”.131 However, it is made clear that the use of such 
recordings need a proper legal base, a legitimate aim and must be necessary in a 
democratic society in order not to constitute a breach of Article 8.132 
 
Provided that the above-mentioned requirements are met in relation to intelligence services 
as counter-terrorism efforts, I would like to point the possibility of permitting further-
                                                
129 Klass and others vs. UK, 6 September 1978, Series A, No. 28(1979-80), 2EHRR214, para 50. 
130 Leander vs. Sweden, 26 March 1987, Series A, No. 116; (1987) 9EHRR462. 
131 Perry vs. UK (App. 63737/00), 17 July 2003; (2004) 39EHRR76, para 40. 
132 See Jacobs & White “The European Convention on Human Rights, fourth edition, pages 286-294. 
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ranging methods. Such methods might be at odds with the present interpretation of Article 
8. 
 
Firstly, I base this on the threat posed by terrorists, and that the Court previously has 
acknowledged a State a rather wide margin of appreciation in questions on national 
security. 
 
Secondly, in order to achieve balance between measure and threat, an idea is to exclude 
evidence obtained by such wide-ranging methods from being used in a trial. Hereby, the 
chances of preventing a terror attack are increased while the interference with the privacy 
of a terrorist suspect is compensated for by exclusion of evidence in court. One may argue 
that such a system should only apply to persons suspected for very serious crimes, such as 
terrorism, in order to justify a further interference with the right to respect for private life. 
This is, in my view, an assessment that may be made under the requirement “necessary in a 
democratic society”. 
 
Thirdly, when facing a sophisticated type of crime such as terrorism, preventing and 
combating this phenomenon can be characterized as a “battle of technologies”. Since 
terrorists have proven to be highly capable of adapting to counter-terrorism measures, the 
society must again adapt to their adaptations. Or, favourably, be more foreseeing in the 
struggle against terror. It lies in the nature of modern society that there is a certain need for 
interference with the privacy of selected citizens in order to maintain the rule of law. 
 
The Court’s stand in relation to Article 8 would be interesting to see. To expect the 
approval of the Court necessitates at least sufficient safeguards against abuse and 
destruction of information obtained if suspicion is proven to be false. In addition one 
should in this regard open for the possibility for compensation after the event, and ensure 
independent judicial control with the measure in question. 
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4.3.6 Articles 9 and 10 
 
It is my opinion that Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention, for the reasons given in the 
illustrative case below, are closely connected in promoting tolerance and cultural 
understanding. 
 
The issue of terrorism must be seen in the historical, cultural, religious and geopolitical 
context through which our present situation has evolved. These backgrounds define the 
frames for our approaches in the fight against terrorism. As previously shown, terrorism 
cannot be defeated without dealing with the root causes of its nature, one of them being 
misunderstandings or lack of understanding and tolerance between cultures. Increased 
understanding and tolerance between cultures is therefore a necessary aim to achieve. 
 
Religion is currently one of the driving motivations behind terror attacks and attempts 
thereof. For democracy to project a stabile image, continuous respect for Article 9 of the 
Convention that protects the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, is required. 
Article 9 is formulated as follows: 
 
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or 
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, 
in worship, teaching, practice and observance.” 
 
To avoid new enemies of democracy, it is important not to exceed the limitations permitted 
in paragraph 2 of this Article: 
 
“2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief shall be subjected only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interest of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for 
the protection of rights and freedoms of others.” 
 
Complicating the matter is the fact that we are facing terrorists who demand to be tolerated 
by the same society they have no tolerance for. Religions or other ideologies are not the 
problem; it is the fanatic frame of mind that entails resort to terrorist methods that must be 
defeated. 
 
Article 10 of the Convention, protecting freedom of expression is worded as follows: 
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“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers…” 
 
 
The connection between these two Articles is shown by the surroundings of the renowned 
Mohammed caricatures.133 Muslims worldwide found the drawings offensive. On 2 
October 2006 a documentary concerning the printings of these caricatures in a Norwegian 
magazine was broadcasted on national television.134 Riots in the Muslim world and an 
attack against the Norwegian embassy in Damascus came as a result of the article. The 
documentary revealed that the editor-in-chief printed the drawings while giving the ethics 
of the press due consideration, and under the belief that he was protected by the freedom of 
expression. After picturing a massive pressure put on the editor-in-chief, the documentary 
indicated that the Norwegian Prime Minister chose to partly blame the former personally 
for the damages that occurred subsequent to the article. Moreover, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs referred to the incident as “extremism on both sides” on the Muslim TV-network 
“Al-Jazeera”. 
 
Rather than seeking to defend one of the pillars of democracy, one may interpret the 
actions of the Norwegian Government as attempts to diminish the importance of and 
apologize for the article. 
 
It may have contributed to settle the riots and anger this time, although numerous people 
were killed as a result of the caricatures being printed worldwide, but the core issue 
remains unsolved. Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention protect and embrace the different 
beliefs and opinions of everyone, also of those who in the end resort to violence. It is the 
resort to violent means that is unjustifiable. Democracy, in order to prevail against 
terrorism, cannot accept to be coerced into undermining the value of these Articles. 
                                                
133 First printed in Denmark by Jyllands-Posten on 30 September 2005. 
134 The relevant magazine, however not the first to print the caricatures in Norway, was “Magazinet” with 
editor in chief Vebjørn Selbekk. The documentary was titled “Document 2: truet til taushet” (threatened to 
silence). 
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4.4 Mutations and adaptations of terrorism in the future 
 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis has previously had its eye on the ideologically motivated terrorism. Terrorism 
may, however, take various shapes and forms. The following is based on the CTC 
theory.135 
 
 
4.4.2 The CTC theory 
 
Research by criminologists has proven the existence of a nexus between terrorism and 
organized crime that displays in several manners. One criminologist has pointed out that 
this relationship can be presented in a “crime-terror continuum” (CTC). The CTC theory 
takes into consideration the past, present and future development of organized crime and 
terrorism. In addition it considers the possibility of one single group changing character in 
accordance with its environment. 
 
Firstly, one has the forming of one-off, short-term or long-term alliances between the 
organized crime syndicates and terrorist groups. Such alliances may be formed for several 
reasons, for instance the seeking of operational support or expert knowledge. An example 
is the fact that in 1993 the Medellin cartel hired the ELN to plant car bombs136. This tactic, 
however, seems currently to be less favoured. 
 
Secondly, researchers have observed that the two criminal groups restructure themselves 
and hereby become capable of employing both features of organized crime and terrorism. 
For instance, in the 1990’s, the Italian Mafia engaged in bombing tourist attractions as a 
                                                
135 See “Global Organized Crime…”, pages 159-173. 
136 Pablo Escobar founded the Colombian Medellin cartel. The ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) was a 
Colombian guerrilla group. 
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response to the Government’s counter-mafia measures. Terrorist groups have most 
commonly been involved in drug trafficking in addition to fraud and human smuggling. 
 
Thirdly, these initially different ends converge at a point were the organization can exhibit 
features of both groups at the same time. The basis of this situation is that criminal 
networks present political motivations, while terrorist organizations use their political aims 
as a façade for criminal activities. 
 
It is my understanding that society is then left with a highly powerful phenomenon with the 
capability to adapt to a wide spectre of counter-measures. As long as such co-operation and 
restructuring proves beneficial it seems difficult to assume otherwise than that such a 
pattern will continue in the future. For this reason it is likely that combating terrorism in 
the future will involve counter-measures against organized crime. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
 
 
An imperative in the struggle against terrorism is to embrace the issue as part of our 
existence, and deny the hateful and degraded feelings of revenge to let us suppress the 
phenomenon. Dealing with its root causes is the only way of defeating the threat to 
democracy. 
 
Through this thesis I have wished to point out that the world has been moving in the right 
direction in its cause against terrorism, since the verdict in McCann and others vs. UK. 
However, one may rightfully criticize the time it has taken to achieve certain goals. The 
most striking feature of the democratic societies’ response to terrorism is the lack of 
international agreement on a comprehensive anti-terror convention including a definition. 
Kofi Annan has on the behalf the UN addressed the need for the international community 
to speak with one voice. The political excuses surrounding this topic are, as I see it, no 
longer justifiable. 
 
The Court has in relation to Article 2, 3 and 5 of the Convention, already set “non-
negotiable” standards in particular with regards to the right to life and the prohibition of 
torture. These do not leave much margin of appreciation for the State in its actions against 
terrorists. The Court has demanded a high level of care taken in cases where the use of 
lethal force may be a likely outcome. When measuring counter-terror efforts up against 
Article 2 of the Convention, holding a strict interpretation of Article 2 avoids that it 
becomes possible to carry out “death penalties” by use of lethal force. In my opinion the 
Court has clearly signalled that lethal force is to be a last resort when combating terrorism. 
 
Looking to Article 3 of the Convention, there is not much room left for “speculative” 
means of interrogation. I do not hereby disregard the likely existence and development of 
interrogation methods that prove efficient and do not violate this prohibition. Violation of 
Article 3 would mean a severe set back in defeating terrorism. 
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It is presumable that the future fight against terrorism will be about technology and 
surveillance techniques. Article 8 represents therefore the main challenge for legislators. 
Legislators must face the threat of terrorism without violating the right to respect for 
private and family life in a technological society. It seems unlikely that the “battle of 
technologies” can be stopped or put on hold. Being a step ahead of the terrorist requires 
either to foresee the persons move on a general basis, or to interfere particularly with his or 
her privacy in order to confirm or refute a suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities. 
 
Both approaches raise issues under Article 8. An interference with the rights under this 
provision does not per se constitute a breach, given that it is justified. A comprehensive 
part of the test of justification is whether sufficient safeguards are provided and if the 
interference has the character of a proportionate measure. If legislators, judicial authorities, 
law-enforcement personnel and others involved can meet the challenge of striking this 
balance, another large step is taken in the correct direction. 
 
Sadly, however salute able such an achievement is, it is insufficient alone. Since the “fire 
vs. fire” strategy pulls in the opposite direction, the effect of the legal approaches is 
limited. Consequently, the “fire vs. fire” mentality must be banned for several reasons.  
 
Firstly, it merely forces terrorism to adapt and reappear in a stronger form. One terrorist 
killed, fortunately, does not result in one terrorist less. 
 
Secondly, it does not deal with the root causes of terrorism. On the contrary, it refuels 
those that are already there. Criminologists have researched well on the root causes of 
“ordinary” crimes. Terrorism represents the same issues in enlarged version. 
 
Thirdly, a “fire vs. fire” strategy mirrors the very image of democracy that terrorists seek 
to project. 
 
Furthermore, I hold the view that in particular the expression “war on terror” is a horrific 
simplification. Without any legal foundation proper, it causes severe confusion with 
regards to the necessity of clear lines in the struggle against terrorism. It is an unfortunate 
example of lack of a cool head and a clear mind. With its lucid reference to war as a 
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phenomenon it poses a central legal question, namely which rules are to govern the actions 
taken. 
 
Firstly, a war strategy has no connection with the judicial body of a democracy. They 
represent two profoundly different machineries whereas the war machinery should be 
saved for the situations of armed conflict in accordance with international humanitarian 
law. 
 
Secondly, terrorism should exclusively be dealt with as a criminal offence and punished by 
judicial authorities. Hereby democracy can project an image of being stabile against threats 
and remain being so, denying terrorists the destabilization they seek. 
 
However, violent counter-terrorist methods have proven necessary. The involvement of 
anti-terror squads or military force does not necessarily pose a problem in this respect as 
long as whom they work for is well defined. To achieve maximum effect of legal efforts it 
must be absolutely unambiguous whether such forces are employed by Justitia as law-
enforcement personnel, or by the phenomenon of war. 
 
Legal efforts gain worth in co-operation with promotion of cultural tolerance, 
understanding and the circulation of information. Bearing this in mind, to protect 
democracy it is therefore imperative to protect the freedom of expression. 
 
The strategy of the five D’s presented by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan encapsulates 
the means and aspects necessary to combat the phenomenon of terrorism. It is possible for 
democracy to prevail while protecting human rights, in fact I argue that democracy cannot 
prevail without. Protecting human rights is necessary in order to present democracy as a 
stabile institution even in shocking and horrifying moments. Neglecting this gives birth to 
new terrorists. Terrorists are not deterred by violence, but they fear our human rights 
protection.137 
 
I believe that the possibilities of combating terrorism open to democratic legal systems, 
while duly respecting all human rights, lie in further elaboration of Article 8 of the 
                                                
137 See “Protecting Human Rights while fighting Terrorism”, Section IV. 
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Convention. Indeed that would be to move from brutality to elegancy in combating 
terrorism. 
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